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Research on implicit processes has become increasingly popular during the past two decades. 
Nevertheless, relatively little attention has been given to clarifying the meaning of the 
concept implicit. We propose implicit processes are processes that possess features of 
automaticity. Because different automaticity features do not necessarily co-occur, we 
recommend specifying the automaticity features one has in mind when using the term 
implicit. We provide an overview of the definitions of the various automaticity features that 
are used in the cognitive decompositional approach of automaticity. Because it is difficult to 
diagnose the cognitive automaticity features of mental processes, we explore for the first time 
a functional decompositional approach to automaticity in which automaticity features are 
defined in non-mental terms and used to describe effects. We end by discussing the 
implications of our analysis for research on the role of implicit processes in scientific 
behavior.  
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 Psychology as a scientific discipline is directed at understanding the processes 
underlying behavior. During the past two decades, more and more psychologists have 
become interested in the impact that so-called implicit processes have on behavior. This 
evolution can be seen in the various sub-disciplines of psychology, including general 
psychology (e.g., Schacter, 1987), social psychology (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), 
clinical psychology (e.g., Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001), and addiction research 
(e.g., Wiers & Stacy, 2006). In line with this evolution, the current book addresses the topic 
of implicit and explicit processes in one particular aspect of human behavior, namely 
scientific behavior. 
 Despite the huge interest in implicit processes, relatively little attention has been 
given to the question of what it means to say that a process is implicit. In this chapter, we 
present an overview of the conceptual work that we have performed in this context over the 
past years (see De Houwer, 2006, in press; De Houwer & Moors, 2007, 2010; De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009a, 2009b; Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2006b, 
2007; Moors, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2010). The starting point of our analysis is the postulate 
that the meaning of the term implicit is identical to the meaning of the term automatic. As we 
will argue later on, defining implicit as automatic has the advantage that it encompasses 
many of the earlier, more informal definitions that have been given for the concept implicit. It 
also allows one to draw on the extensive conceptual work on automaticity that has been 
undertaken in the past. 
 In this chapter, we put forward the following ideas. First, automaticity is not an all-or-
none property of mental processes but refers to a set of features that do not necessarily co-
occur within each automatic process. Hence, it does not make sense to simply say that a 
process is implicit because there is no agreement about the automaticity features to which this 
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term refers (see Bargh, 1989, 1992; Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2007). Second, the 
heterogenic nature of the concept automaticity calls for a decompositional approach in which 
researchers need to specify for each process which automaticity features are thought to apply 
to that process. This requires a precise definition of each automaticity feature. Within a 
cognitive decompositional approach (Bargh, 1992; Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2007), most 
automaticity features are defined in terms of mental constructs such as goals, consciousness, 
and processing resources. Hence, when using the term implicit, one should specify in a 
precise manner the automaticity features one has in mind (i.e., De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer 
et al., 2009a). Third, claims about automaticity features need to be backed up with sound 
arguments and empirical evidence. Hence, when claiming that a process is implicit in a 
certain manner, one should be able to justify these claims (De Houwer et al., 2009a, 2009b). 
Fourth, obtaining evidence for the automaticity of mental processes is complex (see Moors et 
al., 2010). Hence, studying the implicit nature of mental processes can run into important 
problems. Finally, we introduce the idea that progress in understanding the nature of implicit 
processes can be facilitated by a functional decompositional approach to automaticity (De 
Houwer, in press). This approach entails that automaticity features are defined strictly in 
terms of observable elements in the environment rather than unobservable mental constructs. 
In addition, the primary aim is to examine the automaticity features of effects (i.e., the causal 
impact of elements in the environment on behavior). Knowledge about the automaticity of 
effect, however, can be used to guide the construction of models about the mental processes 
by which elements in the environment influence behavior (see De Houwer, in press). We end 
the paper by illustrating the implications of our analysis for future research on implicit 
processes underlying scientific behavior.   
               Defining Implicit 
 
5
Automaticity is not an all-or-none feature 
 According to the dual-mode or all-or-none view on automaticity, processes are either 
automatic or non-automatic. Automatic processes are assumed to have all automaticity 
features; non-automatic processes have the opposite features. For instance, all automatic 
processes are assumed to be unintentional, uncontrolled, unconscious, efficient, and fast 
whereas all non-automatic processes are assumed to be intentional, controlled, conscious, 
inefficient, and slow. According to this view, it is relatively easy to diagnose a process as 
automatic. It suffices to demonstrate that the process possesses one of the automaticity 
features. If it has one of the features, it can be assumed to have all other automaticity feature 
and thus to be fully automatic. 
 It became clear, however, that the different automaticity features do not always co-
occur. Evidence from Stroop studies, for instance, suggests that the processing of word 
meaning is automatic in that it does not depend on the intention to process the meaning of the 
word. At the same time, word processing is non-automatic in that it depends on the allocation 
of attention to the word (see Bargh, 1989, 1992, 1994, and Logan, 1985, 1989, for a 
discussion of this evidence). Several reasons can be identified for why the all-or-none view 
on automaticity remained popular despite the evidence against it (see Moors & De Houwer, 
2007, for a discussion). Nevertheless, there can be little doubt about the fact that this view is 
incorrect.  
Given the assumption that the concepts automatic and implicit can be used in an 
interchangeable manner, one can conclude that it makes little sense to simply say that a 
process is implicit. This means little more than saying that a process possesses one or more 
features of automaticity, leaving it unspecified which automaticity features apply. Hence, 
               Defining Implicit 
 
6
when using the term implicit, it is best to always make explicit the automaticity features one 
refers. Such an approach can be called decompositional in that the concepts implicit and 
automatic are actually decomposed into various non-overlapping features. However, a 
decompositional approach is meaningful only if one can clearly define the different 
automaticity features in a non-overlapping way. In the next section, we discuss the cognitive 
decompositional approach that does incorporate detailed definitions of these features.  
The cognitive decompositional approach to automaticity 
 Within this section, we first provide an overview of the definitions of automaticity 
features as put forward by Moors and De Houwer (2006a, 2007). The main purpose of this 
overview is to show that detailed, non-overlapping definitions of automaticity features can 
and have been formulated. Researchers who want to make explicit their ideas about the 
implicit nature of processes can thus draw upon these definitions. Next we discuss whether 
the cognitive decompositional approach allows one to encompass the different definitions 
that have been given in the past for the concept implicit. Finally, we examine the problems 
that can arise when diagnosing whether a process possesses certain automaticity features. 
Defining automaticity features 
 Many automaticity features such as (un)intentional, goal-directed, goal-(in)dependent, 
(un)controlled/(un)controllable, and autonomous, are somehow related to goals. Perhaps the 
most central goal-related automaticity feature is the feature uncontrolled. Uncontrolled is the 
opposite of controlled. We therefore start with a definition of controlled. To say that a 
process is controlled implies a proximal goal (i.e., a goal regarding the target process such as 
the goal to engage in, alter, stop, or avoid the process) that causes the achievement of the end 
state put forward in the goal (i.e., the actual occurrence, change, interruption, or prevention 
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of the process). To say that a process is uncontrolled can therefore have different meanings. It 
can refer to the fact that the state of a process changes (i.e., that the process occurs, changes, 
is interrupted, or prevented) in the absence of a goal to achieve this change. It can also refer 
to the fact that the goal is present but the desired effect is absent. For instance, a process can 
be called uncontrolled when the process occurs despite the goal to prevent the occurrence of 
the process. A process can also be described as uncontrolled when both the goal and the 
desired effect are present, but the effect was not caused by the goal. Imagine that you have 
the goal to kneel down in front of your loved one in order to propose marriage. You do kneel 
down but it happens because someone pushes you. In that case, both the goal and the desired 
effect are present, but it would be wrong to regard the act of kneeling down as controlled 
because the goal did not cause the desired effect.  
 Other goal-related automaticity features can be defined in terms of the feature 
uncontrolled. To say that a process is intentional means that the goal to engage in a process 
causes the occurrence of the process. Hence, intentional is identical to controlled in the sense 
of the goal to engage in (rather than the goal to alter, stop, or avoid the process). Therefore, 
unintentional processes are a subset of uncontrolled processes. A process can be termed 
unintentional because the process occurs without the intention to engage in the process or 
because the goal to engage does not cause the occurrence of the process. The feature 
autonomous can be defined as uncontrolled in terms of every possible processing goal. That 
is, an autonomous process is a process that is uncontrolled in every possible sense. Goal-
independent processes are processes that operate independently from proximal goals (i.e., 
goals relating to the target process such as the goal to start, stop, alter, or avoid the process) 
and distal goals (i.e., goals unrelated to the target process). Therefore, a process might be 
uncontrolled but still be goal-dependent. Finally, processes can be described as purely 
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stimulus-driven when in addition to being goal-independent (i.e., not dependent on any type 
of goal), they also do not depend on other factors such as awareness or attention. The 
occurrence of purely stimulus-driven processes depends only on the presence of a stimulus 
and certain basic conditions which ensure that the stimulus can be physically registered (e.g., 
in the case of visual stimuli, that the eyes are not closed).  
 The feature unconscious is often listed as a core feature of automaticity. 
Unfortunately, (un)consciousness as a mental state is notoriously difficult to define (see 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, for an analysis). This limits its usefulness as a defining feature 
of automaticity. It is also important to realize that the term unconscious can be used as a 
predicate of several things. It can refer to (a) the stimulus input that evokes the process, (b) 
the output of the process, (c) the process itself, or (d) the consequences of the process such as 
its influence on subsequent processing (e.g., Bargh, 1994). Therefore, when using the term 
unconscious, it is important to specify what it is a predicate of. Note that there is no complete 
overlap between the feature (un)conscious and goal-related features. For instance, our 
definitions allow for the possibility of unconscious intentional processes, that is, a process 
that occurs only when there is a goal to engage in the process but that can operate in the 
absence of awareness of the process, its input, output, or consequences.  
 A process can also be automatic in the sense of efficient. Efficient processes can be 
defined as processes that consume few processing resources or attentional capacity. Because 
efficiency leads to the subjective experience that processing is effortless, the terms efficient 
and effortless are often used interchangeably. Again there is no complete overlap between 
efficiency and other automaticity features. Whereas goals are related to the direction of 
attention (goals may determine the focus of attention), efficiency is related to the amount of 
attention. We also allow for the possibility of a state of consciousness that exists outside of 
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attention and thus for efficient conscious processes (Block, 1995). Likewise, in principle, 
processes can be unconscious but non-efficient (e.g., Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002).  
Finally, processes can be automatic in the sense of fast. The feature fast refers to the 
time that is needed for a process to run to completion. This feature is clearly a gradual 
feature. There is no objective threshold for calling something fast or slow, so investigators 
need to rely on common sense arguments for calling some interval short or long or for 
deciding whether a process is fast or slow. Processes that are fast also tend to be uncontrolled 
(because the implementation of goals tends to require time), unaware (because consciousness 
needs time to develop), and efficient (because efficient processes are typically faster than 
non-efficient processes). Nevertheless, this overlap is only partial in that some uncontrolled, 
unconscious, or efficient processes might be slow and some controlled, conscious, or 
inefficient processes might be fast.  
Describing implicit processes in terms of automaticity features 
In the past, researchers have described processes as being implicit because they 
operate in an unintentional, uncontrolled, efficient, fast, or unconscious manner. Our 
definition of implicit as automatic, in combination with a decompositional approach of 
automaticity allows us to encompass many if not all of the previous definitions of implicit 
processes. The decompositional approach also clarifies that researchers need to make explicit 
the automaticity feature that they have in mind when using the concept implicit and it 
provides them with the conceptual tools to precisely describe their definition of the crucial 
automaticity features. Hence, we hope that our analysis of the concepts implicit and 
automatic will improve communication amongst researchers when they study implicit 
processes.  
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We do not commit ourselves to one particular automaticity feature as being the 
crucial feature for diagnosing whether a process is implicit. Others have put forward one 
specific feature such as the feature unintentional (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Richardson-
Klavehn, Lee, Joubran, & Bjork, 1994) or the feature unconscious (e.g., Schacter, 1987) as 
the one feature that determines whether a process qualifies as implicit. In our opinion, the 
selection of a particular feature or set of features as central for implicit processes cannot be 
settled on the basis of a priori arguments but needs to be decided on the basis of empirical 
data. The distinction between implicit and explicit processes is functional only if it allow us 
to increase our understanding of (the processes underlying) behavior. If behavior is not 
differentially affected by whether the underlying process possesses a particular automaticity 
feature, then there is little added value in distinguishing between implicit and explicit 
processes on the basis of that automaticity feature. Hence, the concept implicit should be 
linked to the features that actually matter for behavior. For instance, research on implicit 
memory has shown that the conscious or unconscious nature of memory retrieval is relatively 
unrelated to the way in which variables influence memory retrieval (e.g., the impact of level 
of processing during encoding). What does seem to matter is whether retrieval is intentional 
(see Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1994). This suggests to us that it is more functional to define 
implicit memory in terms of the feature unintentional than in terms of the feature 
unconscious. It remains to be seen, however, whether these results generalize to processes 
other than memory retrieval. Until sufficient data are available for selecting one automaticity 
feature as central for the concept implicit, we prefer a broad definition of implicit as 
automatic covering several automaticity features. Of course, the selected features need to be 
made explicit and defined in an unambiguous manner.  
 One could, however, argue that such a broad definition is problematic (e.g., Nosek & 
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Greenwald, 2009). First, defining implicit as automatic and explicit as non-automatic might 
blur the distinction between implicit and explicit processes. We agree that most processes are 
probably automatic (and thus implicit) in some ways and non-automatic (and thus explicit) in 
other ways. This does indeed blur the distinction. However, at present we believe that 
defining implicit as automatic and explicit as non-automatic is the best available alternative. 
As indicated above, one could select one automaticity feature as the criterion that provides 
the dividing line, but it is not clear which criterion should be selected or whether it will ever 
be possible to reach consensus about the to-be-selected criterion. Hence, for now it is best not 
to commit to one feature but to adopt a broad definition that allows each researcher to make 
explicit the specific feature that they have in mind.  
Difficulties with examining the automaticity features of mental processes  
Although our definition of implicit does allow researchers to specify in great detail 
the conceptualization that they have in mind, even conceptually precise claims about the 
implicit nature of processes have little value when these claims cannot be backed up by valid 
arguments and empirical evidence. Therefore, claiming that a process is implicit not only 
requires precision but also justification. Unfortunately, several important challenges need to 
be overcome in order to obtain empirical evidence for automaticity features of mental 
processes. In this section, we provide a brief overview of these challenges (for more details, 
see De Houwer, in press; De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010; Moors et al., 
2010).  
 
 Each automaticity feature refers to a certain set of conditions. For instance, the feature 
unintentional refers to a situation in which the goal to initiate a process is absent. A process is 
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said to possess a certain automaticity feature if it operates under the set of conditions 
specified by the automaticity feature. For instance, the process qualifies as unintentional if it 
operates in the absence of the goal to initiate that process. Therefore, in order to examine the 
automaticity features of a mental process, the following steps need to be taken: First, it needs 
to be established that the set of conditions that is specified by a feature, is actually present 
(e.g., that a person does not have the goal to initiate the process). Second, one should be able 
to ascertain that the process operates under those conditions.  
When adopting a cognitive decompositional approach, both steps are complicated by 
the fact that mental constructs cannot be observed directly (see De Houwer, in press; De 
Houwer et al., 2010). First, several automaticity features refer to the presence or absence of 
unobservable mental constructs. For instance, goal-related features refer to goals. Likewise, 
the feature efficient refers to the construct of mental resources. Goals and mental resources 
cannot be observed directly. One can at best infer their presence on the basis of observable 
elements in the environment or observable behavior (e.g., task instructions or performance on 
a secondary task) but such inferences depend on assumptions that might not always hold 
(e.g., that participants follow instructions or that a secondary task loads the same resources as 
the primary task).  
 Second, many of the mental processes that are studied by cognitive psychologists 
(e.g., the formation of associations in memory, the activation of nodes and associations in 
semantic networks, working memory, and reasoning) cannot be observed directly. Consider 
the process of attitude activation (see Moors et al., 2010, for a more detailed discussion of 
this example). Attitudes can be conceived of as mental representations that specify a positive 
or negative disposition toward a certain object (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). Unfortunately, 
attitudes (e.g., toward science) cannot be observed directly. Researchers have therefore 
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developed tasks that provide measures of attitudes. One of these measures is affective 
priming (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; see De Houwer et al., 2009a, for a 
review). Affective priming refers to the observation that responses to a target stimulus (e.g., 
HAPPY) are faster when it is preceded by a prime stimulus with the same affective valence 
(e.g., SUMMER) than when the prime stimulus has a different valence (e.g., CANCER). 
Because affective priming can occur only if the attitude toward the prime stimulus has been 
activated, the observation of affective priming allows one to conclude that attitude activation 
has taken place. The automaticity of attitude activation can be examined by examining the 
conditions under which affective priming occurs. For instance, if affective priming occurs 
even when participants do not have the goal to retrieve their attitudes towards the prime 
stimuli, one can conclude that attitude activation was unintentional. 
 There are, however, limitations to the extent to which the automaticity features of 
mental processes such as attitude activation can be inferred. First, although the presence of an 
observable effect (e.g., affective priming) allows one to infer the presence of certain mental 
processes (e.g., attitude activation), the absence or change in the size of the effect does not 
allow one to infer the absence of or change in the operation of a particular mental process. 
Affective priming, for instance, depends not only on the activation of the attitude towards the 
prime but also on other processes by which the activation of the prime attitude influences 
responses to the target (e.g., spreading of activation or response activation; see De Houwer et 
al., 2009a, for a review). Therefore, if affective priming is absent under the conditions 
specified by a particular automaticity feature (e.g., when participants do not direct attentional 
resources to the prime; e.g., Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000; but see Degner, 2009), this 
does not mean that attitude activation does not possess that automaticity feature (see 
Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 2008, and Moors et al., 2010, for a detailed discussion 
               Defining Implicit 
 
14
of this issue). More generally, because observable behavior is often (if not always) 
determined by multiple mental processes, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about a 
single process based on the absence of or change in a particular behavior.  
A second limitation is that even the presence of a behavioral effect informs us only 
about mental processes that are conceptualized at the functional level. Marr (1982) pointed 
out that mental processes can be described at three levels: The functional, algorithmic, and 
implementational level. Functional descriptions of mental processes specify what the 
processes do, that is, which inputs are transformed into which outputs. For instance, at the 
functional level, attitude activation can be described as (a necessary part of) the mental 
process by which stimuli in the environment cause evaluative responses (see De Houwer et 
al., 2010). The algorithmic level deals with a symbolic description of the way in which the 
mental process achieves this function. For instance, attitude activation can be attributed to the 
activation of evaluative nodes in a semantic network (e.g., Fazio, 2007). Finally, the 
implementation level refers to how the mental process can be physically instantiated, for 
instance, in a (simulated) human brain. 
Importantly, there is a many-to-one relation between the algorithmic descriptions and 
functional descriptions. For instance, the functional process of attitude activation can be 
conceived of at the algorithmic level not only as involving the activation of evaluative nodes 
in a semantic network (e.g., Fazio, 2007) but also in terms of the retrieval of separate 
episodic memory traces (e.g., Schwarz, 2007). Therefore, although the presence of a 
behavioral effect (e.g., affective priming) allows for conclusions about the automaticity of 
functional mental processes (e.g., attitude activation), it does not allow for strong conclusions 
about the automaticity of algorithmic mental processes (e.g., activation of nodes in a 
semantic network). For instance, the conclusion that affective priming can occur in the 
               Defining Implicit 
 
15
absence of the goal to process the prime does not allow for strong conclusions about whether 
evaluative nodes can be activated automatically in a semantic network (see Moors et al., 
2010, for more details).  
Summary 
 The cognitive decompositional approach has been elaborated in detail at the 
conceptual level (Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2007) and can help researchers to specify 
their conceptualization of the term implicit. Unfortunately, problems arise when studying the 
automaticity features of mental processes empirically. These problems result from the fact 
that automaticity features are defined in terms of mental constructs and the fact that 
researchers often aim to determine the automaticity features of (algorithmic) mental 
processes. In the next section, we therefore explore the possibility of developing a 
decompositional approach to automaticity that does not refer to mental constructs.  
Toward a functional decompositional approach to automaticity 
 De Houwer (in press) recently proposed a functional-cognitive framework for 
psychological research that allows for a functional decompositional approach to automaticity. 
Within this approach, automaticity features are defined not in terms of mental constructs but 
in terms of observable elements of the environment.  Although the functional 
decompositional approach is primarily directed at describing the automaticity of effects, it 
can also shed light on the nature of the mental processes that underlie behavior. We start this 
section by briefly explaining the functional-cognitive framework. Afterwards, we provide 
some preliminary ideas about how automaticity features might be defined in a functional, 
non-mental manner. Next, we explore for the first time how research on implicit processes 
might benefit from the functional decompositional approach to automaticity.  
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The functional-cognitive framework for psychological research 
De Houwer (in press) argued that psychological research can have two aims. The first 
aim is to describe which elements of the observable environment influence behavior under 
which conditions. Within the psychology of science, for instance, the first aim would entail 
the discovery of those elements in the environment that determine scientific behavior. 
Examples of such determinants are science education, pictures of famous scientists, and 
rewards that are contingent upon scientific behavior. This first approach can be described as 
functional in that it focuses only on discovering effects (i.e., the causal impact of the 
environment on behavior) and the elements in the environment that moderate these effects. 
The second aim is to describe the mental processes by which elements in the environment 
influence behavior. For instance, once it has been verified that science education has an effect 
on scientific behavior under certain conditions, cognitive theories can be constructed about 
the mental representations that are formed as the result of science education (e.g., positive 
attitudes toward science) and how those representations promote scientific behavior. This is 
the aim of the cognitive approach in psychology. 
Importantly, the functional and cognitive approaches are mutually supportive (see De 
Houwer, in press). Functional knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the moderators of effects) 
imposes constraints on ideas about the mental processes by which the environment influences 
behavior. Therefore, the more we know about the impact of the environment on behavior, the 
better we are able to formulate ideas about the underlying mental processes. The 
development of functional knowledge can in turn benefit from the existence of strong 
cognitive theories because those theories can reveal links between existing pieces of 
functional knowledge (i.e., the heuristic function of theories) and can lead to predictions 
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about yet unknown functional relations (i.e., the predictive function of theories).  
 A decompositional approach to automaticity can be developed within the functional 
approach. The functional approach aims to identify the moderators of effects, that is, the 
environmental conditions under which certain elements of the environment (e.g., science 
education) influence behavior (e.g., performance on scientific tasks). When automaticity 
features are defined in terms of environmental conditions, they can thus be regarded as a 
subset of all moderators of effects. Hence, a functional decompositional approach of 
automaticity entails that effects are characterized in terms of whether they occur under the 
environmental conditions that are specified by the various automaticity features. It differs 
from a cognitive decompositional approach in that (a) automaticity features are described 
only in terms of observable elements in the environment (and not mental constructs) and (b) 
automaticity features are used in first instance to characterize effects rather than mental 
processes. Because research on the automaticity of effects increases functional knowledge of 
those effects, it constraints the development of cognitive theories and thus contributes also to 
our understanding of the mental processes that underlie behavior. In the following sections, 
we explore for the first time whether a functional decompositional approach can be 
developed conceptually (i.e., whether automaticity features can be defined in terms of 
environmental conditions) and what its possible merits might be.  
Defining automaticity features in non-mental terms 
 Within the cognitive decompositional approach, the feature fast was already defined 
in terms of environmental conditions, more specifically, in terms of the length of time. 
Effects can be described as fast when they occur even though little time elapses between the 
presence of the environmental cause (e.g., the prime in an affective priming study) and the 
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observed behavior (e.g., the response to the target).  
 Other features might be re-conceptualized in non-mental terms. The label efficient, 
for instance, could be used to describe effects that occur even in the presence of other 
demanding tasks. Let us return to the example of affective priming effects (i.e., the impact of 
a prime on responses to a target with the same or a different valence as the prime). The fact 
that affective priming effects can occur while participants memorize complex digits (e.g., 
Hermans et al., 2000, but see Degner, 2009) can be taken as evidence for the efficient nature 
of the affective priming effect. Of course, one should also be able to define the nature of 
demanding tasks without referring to mental constructs. One possibility is to define the 
difficulty of a task in terms of the quality of task performance (e.g., speed and accuracy) 
under certain conditions. The task itself can be conceptualized as a set of operant 
contingencies that is present in the environment (i.e., regularities between responses and 
outcomes of those responses that occur under certain conditions). 
Re-conceptualizing goal-related features and (un)consciousness might be more 
difficult. The names of features such as unintentional, goal-independent, and unconscious 
intrinsically refer to mental constructs (i.e., intentions, goals, and consciousness). It would 
thus be difficult to re-define these terms in non-mental terms (but see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Roche, 2001, for suggestions on how mental concepts could be rephrased in functional, 
non-mental terms). An alternative is to introduce new labels that do not refer to mental 
constructs but that capture the environmental conditions associated with cognitive 
automaticity features. For instance, effects could be described as task-independent (rather 
than goal-dependent) if they occur regardless of the presence of other tasks in the 
environment. Uncontrolled effects can be relabeled as proximal task-independent effects, that 
is, effects that occur regardless of the presence of tasks related to the effect. For instance, 
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affective priming can be described as proximal task-independent when the effect occurs even 
if participants are instructed not to show the effect. Finally, effects can be described as non-
reportable (rather than unaware) when participants cannot recognize the effect of the 
environmental cause on their behavior. Of course, much more conceptual work is needed 
before the functional decompositional approach can be considered as a viable alternative for 
the cognitive decompositional approach. In the next section, we argue that there are enough 
potential benefits to justify the further development of the functional decompositional 
approach.  
Merits of the functional decompositional approach to automaticity 
In what ways can the functional decompositional approach to automaticity help 
researchers who would like to study the implicit processes that underlie behavior? First, 
whereas the cognitive decompositional approach focuses on the implicit nature of mental 
processes, the functional decompositional approach highlights the fact that also effects can 
qualify as implicit. Within the functional decompositional approach, automaticity features are 
a subset of all possible environmental moderators of effects. Understanding the 
(automaticity-related) moderators of effects is important as such because it reveals the nature 
of the relation between the environment and behavior and thus helps us to understand, 
predict, and control human behavior (see De Houwer, in press; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). 
For instance, assume that future research will show that science education reduces the 
probability that people will turn to alternative medical practices. Knowing that this effect 
occurs allows one to reduce the extent to which people call upon alternative medicine by 
making science education available in schools. If research also shows that the effect of 
science education on the use of alternative medicine is non-reportable (i.e., the effect occurs 
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regardless of whether people recognize the effect when asked about it), this would suggest 
that there is no need to draw attention to the link between science education and alternative 
medicine in order to expect a relation between both. In sum, functional research - including 
research on the implicitness of effects - has merits as such.  
Second, empirical research on the implicit nature of effects is faced with fewer 
problems than empirical research on the implicitness of mental processes. First of all, 
functional automaticity features are defined in terms of observable environmental conditions 
and are thus easier to establish that cognitive automaticity features that are defined in terms 
of unobservable mental constructs. Moreover, the presence of effects is typically easier to 
verify than the presence of mental processes. Establishing the presence of an effect entails 
that a particular change in behavior (e.g., fast responses to a target) is causally attributed to 
an element in the environment (e.g., the presence of a certain prime). Although causal 
relations cannot be observed directly, experimental procedures allow one to implement the 
controls necessary for drawing causal conclusions with great confidence.  
Third, because of the mutually supportive nature of the functional and cognitive 
approaches, improvement in functional knowledge can improve theories about the mental 
processes that underlie behavior (see De Houwer, in press, for a detailed justification of this 
claim). Knowledge about the functional automaticity features that apply to a certain effect, 
imposes important constraints on the nature of the algorithmic mental processes that are 
assumed to underlie the effect. As such, research on the implicitness of effects can promote 
the development of cognitive theories about the implicit mental processes that underlie 
behavior.  
Whether the functional decompositional approach will actually turn out to be valuable 
for research on implicit processes of course remains to be seen. We have introduced only the 
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basics of the approach and much still remains to be done. Nevertheless, we hope to have 
provided the starting point for these future developments.  
Implications for the study of scientific behavior 
Based on the analysis presented above, the following general guidelines can be 
formulated for researchers who aim to study implicit processes in scientific behavior. First, 
specify the automaticity features that you want to refer to when using the term implicit. It 
does not make sense to simply say that a process or effect is implicit because there is no 
single class of automatic processes that all have the same set of automaticity features. 
Although an all-or-none view of automaticity is appealing because of its simplicity, empirical 
evidence shows that different processes can have different features of automaticity. 
Specifying one’s conceptualization of implicit not only requires the selection of certain 
automaticity features but also a precise definition of those automaticity features. Our earlier 
work (Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2007) provides the basis for defining these features in a 
cognitive manner. In the present chapter, we also discussed ways of defining automaticity 
features in a functional manner.  
 
Second, the claim that a mental process or effect is automatic in a certain sense is 
actually a claim about the conditions under which the process or effect occurs. Hence, these 
claims make sense only when they can be backed up by sound arguments and evidence. It is 
important to realize that claims about cognitive automaticity features of mental processes are 
not easy to back up. In the future, a functional decompositional approach could provide a 
more workable alternative. Even in its current state of development, the functional approach 
highlights the fact that one can describe as implicit or explicit not only mental processes but 
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also effects. The study of the implicit nature of effects can have merits as such and help 
develop theories of the implicit nature of mental processes.  
To illustrate these guidelines, we will relate them to the chapter of Zimmerman and 
Pretz (this volume) about implicit and explicit processing in scientific discovery. They asked 
one group of participants to solve a real-world physics task by looking for a rule. Other 
participants were not given this instruction or asked not to think too hard while performing 
the task. Zimmerman and Pretz referred to the first group as the explicit processing group, 
whereas the second group was referred to as the implicit processing group. With regard to our 
first guideline (i.e., specify the meaning of implicit), they describe dual-process theories that 
make a distinction between implicit and explicit modes of processing (e.g., Evans, 2008; 
Sloman, 1996). The explicit mode is characterized as rule-based, deliberate, and analytical 
and as dependent on awareness, attention, and effort. Implicit processing is described as 
associative, holistic, unaware, and effortless. However, it is not specified whether these 
definitions of implicit and explicit were assumed to hold also for the type of processing that 
was encouraged in their own research. Moreover, their definitions of implicit and explicit are 
based on an all-or-none view of automaticity rather than the decompositional approach (e.g., 
Bargh, 1994; see Keren & Schul, 2009, and Moors & De Houwer, 2006b, for a critical 
discussion of dual-process theories).  
With regard to the second guideline (i.e., justify the meaning of implicit), participants 
were said to have adopted an implicit processing mode when they were not given any 
specific instructions on how to approach the task (Experiment 1) or when they were 
instructed not to think too much about the task (Experiments 2 and 3). These instructions 
could indeed have led to absence of the goal to discover a rule. Processing could thus be 
described as implicit in the sense of independent of the distal goal to solve the problem by 
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finding a rule. However, processing was in all likelihood explicit in many other ways. For 
instance, all participants had the goal to make correct predictions on each trial. Hence, 
processing was probably deliberative (i.e., intentional in the sense of dependent on the 
proximal goal to perform well in the task). Also, participants in the so-called implicit 
conditions were probably aware of the stimuli that were presented and the responses that they 
gave. They might have been unaware of the reasons for their predictions, but Zimmerman 
and Pretz provide no data to verify this. Furthermore, it is possible that (some) participants in 
the implicit condition did use an intentional strategy to solve the problems (i.e., adopted the 
goal to solve the task in a certain manner), be it a strategy other than looking for a rule (e.g., 
responding based on similarity with previous problems). There are also no data about 
whether performance in the implicit conditions was effortless (e.g., no evidence that 
performance did not deteriorate as the result of secondary tasks). Participants gave their 
predictions more quickly in the implicit conditions than in the explicit conditions, but in both 
conditions, reaction times were longer than two seconds, leaving enough time to allow for 
slow acting processes.  
In sum, the data of Zimmerman and Pretz support the important conclusion that the 
quality of scientific problem solving can sometimes benefit from a processing mode that can 
be described as implicit in the sense of operating in the absence of the goal to finding a rule. 
We do not exclude the fact that scientific problem solving can benefit from processes that are 
implicit in other senses (e.g., unaware or effortless), but the evidence provided by 
Zimmerman and Pretz does not allow for such a conclusion. The fact that Zimmerman and 
Pretz adopted a broad, all-or-none definition of the concept implicit conceals the true 
contribution of their work and could create the impression that their results generalize to 
other processes with other automaticity features. We hope that this example illustrates how 
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our analysis can contribute to research on the role of implicit processes in scientific behavior.  
Conclusion 
The distinction between implicit and explicit processes has become a hot topic in 
psychological research. Unfortunately, this distinction is more complex than is often 
assumed. At the conceptual level, it is best not to think of the relation between implicit and 
explicit processes as an all-or-none distinction between, on the one hand, processes that have 
all automaticity features and, on the other hand, processes that do not have any automaticity 
features. Because different processes can possess different features of automaticity, one 
should specify the automaticity features one has in mind when using the term implicit. At the 
empirical level, important problems can arise when trying to back up claims about the 
automaticity features under study. This is especially the case when automaticity features are 
defined in terms of mental constructs such as goals and used to describe mental processes. 
We explored for the first time the possible merits of a functional decompositional approach to 
automaticity that tries to solve some of these problems. Nevertheless, it should be clear that 
research on implicit processes can be very complex. One reaction is to simply ignore the 
complexity by continuing to conceptualize implicitness in an all-or-none manner. Although 
this strategy certainly simplifies matters, it is bound to create problems in the long run, for 
instance, when confronted with evidence for automaticity features that do not co-occur. One 
can also choose to ignore the concept implicit and abandon research on implicit processes all 
together. Such an approach runs the risk of missing out on important knowledge about the 
determinants of human behavior. For us the most meaningful strategy is to acknowledge the 
complexity and to try to deal with it in the best way possible. We hope that despite of its 
complexity, researchers will also adopt this strategy when studying scientific behavior.  
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